Last Friday at the UN

Last Friday, the Obama Administration exercised its first veto in the UN Security Council.  In fact, this is the first time since 2006 the US has availed itself of this privilege which is reserved for permanent members of the Security Council.  A single veto is sufficient to prevent action.  The resolution in question had the support of the other 14 members of the Security Council.

Having been inside the government when decision like this are made, I have been reluctant to be too critical.  Many factors must be considered.  Our influence has weakened.  The Palestinians forced our hand.  Policymakers juggle competing demands and they operate in an imperfect world.  The most thoughtful will attempt to find the appropriate balance between the pursuit of American ideals and universal values on the one hand and naked self-interest on the other, realizing that ultimately, the latter is best served when we adhere most closely to the former.  In the end both our words and our deeds have consequences. 

What transpired last week is barely noticed in the U.S., but it scream across the front pages of the Middle East. If American wanted to act in its own interest, and if it wanted to be a true friend to Israel, there was a powerful argument to be made in favor of at least abstaining in the UNSC vote. The resolution is consistent with US policy, and our ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, was left with the unenviable task of explaining the nearly inexplicable:  We agree with the substance of the resolution, but we disagree with the UNSC as the appropriate forum to discuss the issue.  To do so, our argument goes, would undermine efforts to restart direct negotiations between the parties. 

Perhaps there’s an argument to be made here about the utility of taking this to the Security Council, but to suggest that this makes it difficult to get the Israelis back to the table falters on at least two fronts: 1. Unless the Administration is on the verge of performing a diplomatic miracle, I see no way under the sun that this Israeli government will seriously seek a deal with the Palestinians at this moment, given the regional climate and 2. If the vote justification is based on the way this impacts the potential for direct negotiations, you could also say that, conversely, you can't get the Palestinians back to the table unless you pass a resolution, particularly in light of the way in which the Palestine Papers leak exposed the Palestinian negotiators as having been very willing to compromise on sensitive issues.  Add to that the Arab world uprising and you can argue that Palestinian leaders can in no way afford to enter back in to a negotiations process that allows the Israeli policies and actions on settlements to continually undermine the potential for a compromise while the "negotiations" are going on.  

And then there’s this: People in the Middle East see the settlement issue as one of fundamental fairness--an issue of justice.  In this moment of regional upheaval, our veto undermines our ability to talk about issues and values we believe in.  Our muddled veto justification has no credibility.  

But I also know how difficult these things are for policymakers.  To exercise a veto would have created a domestic brush fire which the Administration obviously wanted to avoid.  Many would have accused the President of selling out another friend, and not just any other friend, but one often defined as our only true ally in the Middle East.  And maybe the Administration was right to avoid the domestic fight, but our action is strangely disconnected from the roiling streets of the Middle East and the cries for justice in the region.  And we should likewise be clear that neither US interests, nor Israeli interests were served.  Nor were the values we all claim to hold dear.